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COMMENT 
TURNING TITLE VII'S 
PROTECTION AGAINST 
RETALIATION INTO A 
NEVER-FULFILLED PROMISE 
INTRODUCTION 
While on her journey through the looking glass, Alice received an 
interesting job offer. In exchange for her services, the White Queen 
promised: "jam to-morrow and jam yesterday - but never jam to-day." 
At first, this offer seemed appealing. Alice would receive a treat of jam 
every other day in exchange for her services. But upon further 
consideration, Alice realized the inherent flaw in such a promise. "It 
must come sometimes to jam today," Alice objected. "No, it can't," said 
the Queen. 1 
The White Queen's tricky offer was not a treat of jam every other 
day. This offer would never result in any jam for Alice. Unfortunately, 
this kind of self-defeating logic exists not only in children's literature. A 
recent per curiam decision by a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would tum the protection offered by the 
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
(hereinafter "Title VII") into this same kind of deceiving promise that 
will forever remain unfulfilled.2 
Title VII was enacted to provide fair working environments.3 One 
I LEWIS CARROLL THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE ch. V 
(1871). 
2 See DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 F. App'x 437 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam). 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 255, codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (Westlaw 2007). 
141 
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of the protections it offers is the right of employees to bring retaliation 
claims against their employers when they have been discriminated 
against for participating in certain protected activities.4 The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White clarified the definition of an "adverse action" by an 
employer, which is one of the essential elements of an employment 
retaliation claim. 5 To satisfy the adverse action element, Burlington 
Northern requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged 
employer action "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.,,6 The courts of appeals 
are just beginning to apply this new definition, and many scholars have 
predicted the new standard will benefit plaintiffs.7 However, if the recent 
interpretation of Burlington Northern by the Fifth Circuit in DeHart v. 
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations8 is followed, Title VII may prove to 
be less helpful to workers than Congress or the Supreme Court intended. 
In DeHart, the plaintiff filed a retaliation complaint after receiving a 
poor performance evaluation and a disciplinary warning.9 The DeHart 
court found that no adverse action had occurred, because the plaintiff 
herself was not actually dissuaded from filing a discrimination charge: 
she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC,,).lo But as Part I will 
show, lodging a retaliation complaint with the EEOC is a prerequisite for 
bringing a claim of retaliation under Title VII. II Therefore, DeHart 
4 [d. at § 2000e-5(t)(I)(A). 
5 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
6 [d. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 See, e.g., Christopher J. Eckhart, Employers Beware: Burlington Northern v. White and 
the New Title VII Anti-Retaliation Standard, 41 IND. L. REv. 479, 480 (2008) (describing the 
Burlington Northern standard as expansive and claiming that it will make it easier for employees to 
bring retaliation claims); Peter M. Panken, Retaliation: A Tidal Wave of Employment Litigation -
Getting Mad, Getting Even, and Getting Sued, SN021 ALI-ABA 799, 824 (Feb. 14-16, 2008) 
("[T]he clear import and impact of the Burlington Northern case is that many more retaliation cases 
will go to juries .... "); Nicholas Villani, A Bridge Too Far: The Supreme Court Overextends the 
Anti-Retaliation Provision of Title VII. 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 715, 738 (2007) (predicting the broad 
standard for adverse action from Burlington Northern wiIl result in an overwhelming number of 
retaliation claims because a "vast array of events" can now be considered retaliation). 
8 DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 F. App'x 437 (5th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam). 
9 [d. at 440. 
10 [d. at 442. 
II See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b),(c),(e),(t) (Westlaw 2007). 
A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
within the meaning of title VII ... may be made by or on behalf of any person claiming to be 
aggrieved .... The person making the charge, however, must provide the Commission with 
the name, address and telephone number of the person on whose behalf the charge is made. 
During the Commission investigation, Commission personnel shall verify the authorization 2
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would prohibit a retaliation claim if the employee engages in an activity 
that is a requirement for a retaliation claim. Like the White Queen's rule 
that will never result in any jam for Alice, the Fifth Circuit's rule in 
retaliation cases will never result in vindication for aggrieved employees. 
Part I below discusses a major purpose of Title VII, which is to 
protect employees from employer discrimination. Moreover, Part I 
explains the process of bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII. To 
pursue a retaliation claim in court, a plaintiff must file a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Once in court, a plaintiff 
must satisfy each element of a retaliation claim, which includes proving 
that the employer engaged in an adverse action. 
Part I also explains the varied standards that were previously used 
when deciding what constitutes an adverse employer action and how the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Burlington Northern resolved a split 
among the circuits. In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court adopted 
a deterrence test to define adverse employer actions, which means the 
employer action must be harmful to the point that it would deter a 
reasonable employee of complaining of discrimination. 
Part II analyzes the actual effects of this decision, focusing in 
particular on DeHart. It shows how DeHart misapplied the deterrence 
standard by focusing on whether the employer action at issue deterred 
that plaintifJfrom complaining and not whether it would have deterred a 
reasonable employee from complaining. Part II also warns of the major 
problem associated with adopting a rule like the one set forth in DeHart: 
employees will be afraid to come forward with discrimination claims, 
which will allow employers to discriminate with impunity. 
Part III then stresses the importance of applying the deterrence test 
from Burlington Northern in a way that properly employs its objective 
standard. Courts must consider whether the employer's action would 
have the effect of deterring a reasonable employee from complaining, not 
whether the particular plaintiff was actually deterred. This will avoid 
results similar to DeHart's that can be fatal to potentially valid retaliation 
claims. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that if courts continue to misconstrue the 
subjective aspect of the Burlington Northern standard, then Congress or 
the Supreme Court must either provide clarification on how to identify 
an adverse employer action under the deterrence test, or find a different 
standard: one that asks whether a reasonable employee would have 
considered the employer action to be adverse. 
of such charge by the person on whose behalf the charge is made. 
29 C.F.R. § l601.7(a) (Westlaw 2008) (EEOC procedural regulation). 3
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L RETALIATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII: PURPOSE AND PROCEDURE 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in response to the 
turmoil caused by racial inequalities in America. 12 Title VII of the Act 
protects workers from employer discrimination. Section 703(a) of Title 
VII contains the anti-discrimination provisions, which prohibit employer 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 13 Section 704(a) contains the anti-retaliation provision. 14 These 
two provisions work in tandem to protect workers. They make it illegal 
for an employer to discriminate and to retaliate against employees who 
invoke their right to complain about discriminatory practices prohibited 
by Title VIL I5 
The anti-discrimination provision makes it unlawful for employers 
to discriminate against protected individuals regarding their 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or in any 
way that deprives individuals of employment opportunities or adversely 
affects their status as employees. 16 Consequently, to give rise to a valid 
claim, the difference in treatment must be related to the employment 
relationship. There is a significant difference in the language of this 
substantive anti-discrimination provision of Title VII from the language 
of the anti-retaliation provision. I7 The anti-retaliation provision does not 
contain the same kind of qualifying language when describing what kind 
12 See Michael 1. Fellows, Civil Rights-Shades of Race: An Historically Informed Reading 
of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. R. 387, 397 (2004) (providing background on the compensatory 
purposes of the Civil Rights Act and how those purposes should guide current application of the 
Act); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events 
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645 (1995), 
(describing the racial turmoil in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 that led to President Kennedy's 
decision to have a civil rights bill drafted). 
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (Westlaw 2007). 
1442 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (Westlaw 2007). 
15 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (Westlaw 2007); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) 
(Westlaw 2007). 
Id. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Westlaw 2008). 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classifY 
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
17 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006) ("Title VII's 
substantive anti-discrimination provision protects an individual only from employment related 
discrimination."). 
4
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of discriminatory acts are prohibited. 18 It provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment. .. because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 19 
Thus, the anti-retaliation provision is broader: it only commands 
that an employer may not "discriminate against" an employee for 
engaging in protected activities such as filing or supporting claims of 
employer discrimination; it does not specify how harmful the difference 
in treatment must be in order to constitute retaliation, nor does it explain 
whether the discrimination must be employment-related.20 These 
differences in language have given rise to various theories on how these 
provisions should best be interpreted to meet the purposes of Title VII. 
A. THE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII'S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION 
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII differs from its anti-
discrimination provision not only in language, but also in purpose?1 
Protection of the primary right of an employee-the right to be free from 
employer discrimination-is distinct from protection from retaliation?2 
The Supreme Court's understanding of the two provisions is that the 
anti-discrimination provision "seeks a workplace where individuals are 
not discriminated against" because of their status, while the anti-
retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with 
"an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's 
basic guarantees.,,23 In other words, the anti-discrimination provision 
protects employees because of who they are, and the anti-retaliation 
provision protects employees because of what they do?4 
18 Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (Westlaw 2008) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) 
(Westlaw 2008). 
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (Westlaw 2008) (emphasis added). 
20/d. 
21 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63 ("The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace 
where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, or gender-based 
status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an 
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance 
enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees."). 
22 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-174 (2005). 
23 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63. 
24/d. 
5
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The aim of the anti-retaliation provision is to ensure that employees 
are not too afraid to report unlawful practices in the workplace. 25 If only 
employer discrimination were prohibited, it would not deter the many 
forms that retaliation can take.26 Accordingly, Title VII's anti-retaliation 
provision is included "to prevent employer interference with 'unfettered 
access' to Title VII's remedial mechanisms.,,27 "It does so by prohibiting 
all employer actions that are likely 'to deter victims of discrimination 
from complaining to the EEOC,' the courts, and their employers.,,28 
Therefore, it is the right to bring a retaliation claim that serves as a 
protective measure to guard the "primary right" of being free from 
discrimination.29 
B. BRINGING A RET ALIA nON CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII 
Employees tum to Title VII's protections when they feel they have 
been treated unlawfully by their employer. Anyone aggrieved by 
employment discrimination, whether it be due to retaliation for 
participating in a complaint of discrimination or the actual discrimination 
itself, must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission if he or she chooses to pursue a Title VII 
claim.3o The EEOC is the administrative agency that has been delegated 
the authority to take action on matters of employment discrimination?l 
It has the authority to investigate individual complaints of discrimination, 
to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and 
to sue an employer on a claimant's behalf.32 If the EEOC does not obtain 
voluntary compliance from the employer and for any reason chooses not 
25 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-122 (1972) (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 
389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967». 
26 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63-64 (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 740 F.3d 
980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding actionable retaliation when employer filed false criminal charges 
against employee who complained of discrimination, despite the fact that the retaliatory acts were 
not related to the workplace». 
27 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 
346 (1997». 
28 1d. 
29 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 189. 
30 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (Westlaw 2008). Before filing a complaint, individuals who 
believe they have been discriminated against or retaliated against due to their membership in a 
protected class in violation of Title VII must first consult an EEOC counselor to try to resolve the 
matter informally. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a) (Westlaw 2008). After the EEOC counselor informs the 
individuals of their rights and provides counseling, the counselor then issues a right-to-sue if the 
matter has not been resolved. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(b)-(d) (Westlaw 2008). 
31 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 20003-4, 2003-5 (Westlaw 2008). 
32 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
6
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to sue on a claimant's behalf, the claimant may, after a certain period of 
time has expired, demand a right-to-sue letter and institute a Title VII 
action.33 Whether the EEOC or the employee ultimately pursues the 
claim in court, a potential retaliation plaintiff must always file a charge 
with the EEOC and seek a right-to-sue letter before going to court to 
pursue the retaliation claim.34 
Once an employee obtains the right to sue, that employee must then 
satisfy all the required elements of the claim. Although Title VII does 
not spell out which party bears the burden of proof in a retaliation case,35 
the Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting approach in McDonnell 
Doug/as Corp. v. Green. 36 The burden-shifting mechanism from 
McDonnell starts with the employee making out a prima facie case.37 To 
satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, 
an employee must demonstrate a) that the employee engaged in an 
activity protected by the provisions of Title VII, such as opposing 
unlawful employment practices, complaining about discrimination 
covered by Title VII, or participating in a proceeding that does so; b) that 
the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and c) that a 
causal link exists between the employee's protected activity and the 
adverse employment action.38 
After a plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions.39 If the employer is able to supply such a reason, the burden 
shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's stated reason is 
merely a pretext.40 Of the three elements of a retaliation claim -
protected activity, adverse action, and causation - defining what 
33 Johnson v. R. Express Agency, Inc., 421 V.S. 454, 458 (1975). The statutory period 
generally is 180 days from the filing of the complaint with the EEOC. 42 V.S.C.A. § 20003-5(f)(I) 
(Westlaw 2008). 
34 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Westlaw 2007). 
35 See John Sanchez, The Law oj Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti. 30 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 543 (2007) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions regarding Title VII 
and the First Amendment will make it harder for plaintiffs to succeed in retaliation claims). 
36 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
37 Id. at 802. 
38 Boyd v. Brookstone Corp. of N.H., Inc .. 857 F. Supp. 1568, 1571 (S.D. Fla.1994) (citing 
Jordan v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290 (11th Cir. 1988)); see 42 V.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Westlaw 2008) 
(listing protected activities); Ray v. Henderson 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Filing a 
complaint with the EEOC is a protected activity."); see also Yartzoff v. Thomas 809 F.2d 1371, 
1376 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Causation sufficient to establish the third element of the prima facie case may 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer's knowledge that the plaintiff 
engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the 
allegedly retaliatory employment decision."); see generally 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 
240. 
39 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1240. 
40 1d. 
7
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constitutes an "adverse action" has proven to be the most difficult. This 
is evidenced by the variety of tests circuits were using to define "adverse 
action" before the Supreme Court finally decided which one should 
control.41 
C. PREVIOUS STANDARDS FOR "ADVERSE ACTION" IN THE VARIOUS 
CIRCUITS 
Prior to Burlington Northern, the circuits were divided on the issue 
of how "adverse" an action must be to constitute adverse employment 
action.42 This was due to differing interpretations of the scope of Title 
VII's anti-retaliation provision's phrase "discriminate against.,,43 The 
circuits used tests ranging from a restrictive approach that limited 
adverse actions only to very extreme employment decisions, such as 
hiring and firing, to a permissive objective approach that required courts 
to consider how a reasonable employee would react if faced with the 
discriminatory treatment. 44 
The "ultimate employment decision" standard takes the lack of 
qualifying language in the anti-retaliation section of Title VII as evidence 
that more severe employer action is required for retaliation claims than 
for discrimination claims. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits used this 
restrictive approach, which recognized retaliation claims only for acts 
"'such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and 
compensating. ",45 The Fifth Circuit explained its reason for using this 
41 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60 (2006) ("[D]ifferent 
Circuits have come to different conclusions about whether the action has to be employment or 
workplace related and how harmful that action must be to constitute retaliation."); see generally 
Megan E. Mowrey, Establishing Retaliation for Purposes of Title VlI. III PENN ST. L. REV. 893 
(2007) (discussing the pre-Burlington Northern split among the circuits regarding the definition of 
an adverse action). 
42 See generally Megan E. Mowrey, Establishing Retaliation for Purposes of Title VII. III 
PENN ST. L. REV. 893 (2007) (discussing the pre-Burlington Northern split among the circuits 
regarding the definition of an adverse action). 
43 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S at 57. 
44 For a discussion of the pre-Burlington Northern circuit split over what constitutes an 
adverse employment action, see Marilee L. Miller, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a 
Broad Reading of Title VII's Bar on Retaliation. 2006 UTAH L. REv. 505, 507 (2006). 
Id. 
Several circuits require[d] claimants to show that they suffered an ultimate employment 
action or decision, such as suspension, discharge, or demotion. Other circuits consider[ ed] an 
adverse employment action to include happenings that are material to the terms and 
conditions of employment, even if they fall short of an ultimate employment action or 
decision. Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [was] willing to consider 
adverse those acts that are reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in activity 
protected under Title VII. 
45 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S at 60 (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 
8
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narrow definition of an adverse action in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak 
CO. 46 That case pointed to the difference in language between Title VII's 
anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions, reasoning that 
Congress must have intended the "ultimate employment decision" to be 
the standard because the anti-retaliation provision does not mention the 
vague harms listed in the anti-discrimination provision.47 
The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits held an intermediate 
position that defined an adverse action for retaliation cases with the same 
standard used for the underlying discrimination offense that brought 
about the complaint.48 This "materially adverse" test required "a close 
relationship between the retaliatory action and employment.'>49 Under 
this test, the allegedly retaliatory employer action "must result in an 
adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.,,50 
Although this test included actions other than ultimate employment 
decisions, it still required the adverse employer action to be employment-
related. 
Other circuits used a less restrictive view than either the "ultimate 
employment decision" or "materially adverse" tests when defining an 
adverse action.51 For example, the Seventh and District of Columbia 
Circuits required that a plaintiff show that the "employer's challenged 
action would have been material to a reasonable employee," meaning it 
would have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.',52 The Ninth Circuit used a similar 
"deterrence" test, relying on the definition provided by the EEOC to find 
an adverse action.53 "The EEOC has interpreted 'adverse employment 
action' to mean 'any adverse treatment that is based on retaliatory motive 
and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from 
engaging in protected activity. ",54 
702, 709 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
46 Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., \04 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 
47 Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,709 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)2). 
48 Burlington Northern. 548 U.S. at 60; see Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 
2000) (citing Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) and Torres v. 
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997)). These courts of appeals would "apply the same standard 
for retaliation that they apply to a substantive discrimination offense." Burlington Northern. 548 
U.S. at 60. 
49 Burlington Northern. 548 U.s. at 60. 
50 [d. (internal citations omitted). 
51 Burlington Northern. 548 U.S. at 60-61. 
52 [d. at 60 (citing Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005), 
and Rochon v. Gonzales. 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
53 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1241. 
54 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1242 (quoting 2 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8 p. 8-13 (1998)). "Although EEOC guidelines are not 
9
Beeler: Title VII's Protection Against Retaliation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
150 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
D. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE SPLIT WITH BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN 
Burlington Northern resolved the disagreement among the circuits 
by answering the question of how harmful the employer's adverse action 
must be to fall within the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.55 
The Supreme Court adopted the deterrence test of the Ninth, Seventh, 
and D.C. Circuits as the proper method for finding an adverse employer 
action in a Title VII retaliation claim.56 It also held that employer actions 
need not be employment-related to be considered "adverse" for purposes 
of a retaliation claim. 57 
In June 1997, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company 
hired Sheila White as a track laborer.58 Burlington's roadmaster, Marvin 
Brown, assigned White to the position of forklift operator shortly after 
she arrived on the job.59 In September 1997, White complained to 
Burlington officials that one of her supervisors had repeatedly made 
sexist remarks to her.60 Shortly thereinafter, Brown removed White from 
forklift duty and reassigned her to the less prestigious job of standard 
railroad track laborer.61 
On October 10, 1997, White filed a complaint with the EEOC, 
claiming that the reassignment of her duties constituted unlawful 
discrimination and retaliation for having complained about her 
supervisor.62 She filed a second EEOC complaint in early December, 
"claiming that Brown had placed her under surveillance and was 
monitoring her daily activities.,,63 Notification of that second complaint 
binding on the courts, they 'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" Ray v. Henderson, 217 FJd at 1243 (quoting 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986)). 
55 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 61. 
56 1d. at 68. 
57 1d. at 67. 
58 1d. at 57 (stating that the job of '''track laborer' ... involves removing and replacing track 
components, transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spillage from the 
right-of-way."). 
59/d. 
60 Id. at 58. White was the only female employee in her department at Burlington's 
Tennessee Yard. She complained that her supervisor, Bill Joiner, had repeatedly told her women 
should not be working in that department, and that he had made other insulting remarks to her in 
front of male colleagues. Id. 
61 Id. Burlington suspended Joiner for 10 days and ordered him to attend a sexual-
harassment training session. On September 26, Brown told White about Joiner's discipline and, at 




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/5
2008] TITLE VII'S PROTECTION AGAINST RETALIATION 151 
was mailed to Brown on December 8.64 A few days later, Brown 
suspended White without pay after one of her supervisors told Brown 
that White had been insubordinate.65 After concluding that White had 
not been insubordinate,66 Burlington reinstated her and compensated her 
with backpay for the thirty-seven days she was suspended.67 Because of 
the suspension, White filed an additional retaliation charge with the 
EEOC.68 
White eventually sued Burlington in federal court, claiming that 
both the change of her job responsibilities and the thirty-seven-day 
suspension amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII.69 
A jury found for White on both of her retaliation claims.70 The Sixth 
Circuit later reviewed the matter en banc.71 Although the members of the 
appellate court unanimously agreed to uphold the district court's 
judgment in White's favor, they themselves disagreed on the proper 
standard to apply in determining how harmful the challenged action of 
the employer must be to constitute retaliation.72 A majority defined 
"adverse employment action" as "a materially adverse change in terms of 
employment.,,73 It looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth for guidance.74 In that case, the Supreme Court 
defined an adverse employment action as "a significant change in 
employment status.,,75 Swayed by this definition, the court of appeals 
rejected the EEOC's deterrence standard and reasoned that the 
"materially adverse" standard would sufficiently further the purpose of 
Title VII without straying too far from the statutory language.76 The 
court of appeals then found the defendant railroad's conduct did 
64 Id. 
65 Id. Peter Sharkey was White's immediate supervisor at the time. Although the specific 
facts of the disagreement were in dispute, the two of them disagreed about which truck should 
transport White from one location to another. Id. 
66 Id. White invoked internal grievance procedures that resulted in Burlington concluding 
that she had not been insubordinate. Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 59. 
69 Id. at 59. White brought the Title VII action after exhausting administrative remedies. Id. 
70 Id. The jury awarded White $43,500 in compensatory damages, including $3,250 in 
medical expenses. Id. 
71 Id. A divided Sixth Circuit panel had initially reversed the district court's judgment and 
found in Burlington's favor, but the full court of appeals vacated that decision and heard the matter 
en banco Id. 
72 Id. 
73 White V. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cif. 2005). 
74 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
75 Id. at 761. 
76 White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795-800 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc). 
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constitute an adverse action under the "materially adverse" standard.77 
This set the stage for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split over 
what constitutes an adverse employer action.78 
Noting the distinction in statutory language between Title VII's 
anti-discrimination provisions and its anti-retaliation provision, the 
Supreme Court held in Burlington Northern that the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII is not limited to actions affecting the terms and 
conditions of employment, or even to actions that are related to 
employment or occur at the workplace. 79 This new standard also 
explicitly rejected the previous standards of the courts of appeals that had 
limited actionable retaliation to so-called "ultimate employment 
decisions.,,8o Instead, Justice Breyer's majority opinion articulated the 
new standard as one that prohibits retaliatory actions that would have 
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant.8l 
Justice Breyer then explained that "materially adverse" means "the 
employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could well 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.,,82 This test has both objective and subjective 
components.83 It is objective because it considers the hypothetical 
"reasonable employee.,,84 Justice Breyer explained that the Court 
referred to the reasonable employee because such an objective standard 
avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a 
judicial effort to determine a plaintiffs unusual subjective feelings. 85 He 
then explained that the standard should be phrased in general terms 
because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend 
on the particular circumstances.86 Yet at the same time, the test is also 
77 Id. at 803. 
78 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006) ("We granted 
certiorari to resolve this disagreement. "). 
79 Id. at 64-67. Unlike section 703(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West law 
2008), the anti-discrimination provision), section 704 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (Westlaw 2008), the 
anti-retaliation provision), is broader in that it is not limited to discrimination in regard to hiring or 
firing, much less as to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Section 704 (a) (42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (Westlaw 2008» only requires that the employer "discriminate against" the 
plaintiff. 
80 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67. 
811d. at 68. 
821d. 
83 Id. at 68-69. 
84 Id. at 68 ("We refer to reactions of a reasonable employee because we believe that the 
provision's standard for judging harm must be objective."). 
85 Id. at 68-69. 
86 1d. at 69. The Court gave an example of when the context of an employer's actions might 
make a difference in determining whether the action should be considered retaliatory: "A schedule 
change in an employee's work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/5
2008] TITLE VII'S PROTECTION AGAINST RETALIATION 153 
partly subjective because "context matters" when applying the 
standard. 87 Justice Breyer gave an example of when the subjective 
context matters: "A schedule change in an employee's work schedule 
may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously 
to a young mother with school age children.,,88 
After resolving the issue of what standard to use to find an adverse 
action, the Court then applied the new test. Justice Breyer pointed out 
that the reassignment of job duties is not always actionable.89 Whether a 
particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the 
circumstances of the particular case and "should be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering 
'all the circumstances. ",90 Considerable evidence showed that working 
as a track laborer was dirtier and more arduous than operating the 
forklift. The Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict for White on her retaliation claim, because a 
jury could reasonably conclude that a reassignment of responsibilities 
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.91 
II. DEHART'S ILLOGICAL HOLDING AND How TO AVOID THIS 
MISAPPLICA nON 
The standard from Burlington Northern appears to be beneficial to 
potential plaintiffs in employment cases because the adverse action no 
longer has to be work-reiated.92 But in reality, this standard risks 
misapplication in a way that could instead worsen a retaliation plaintiffs 
situation. This misapplication would be contrary to the purposes of Title 
VII protections by failing to protect employees from certain retaliatory 
employer actions. DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. ,93 a 
Fifth Circuit case, presents one example of how the Burlington Northern 
standard can be misapplied in a way that will prevent retaliation 
plaintiffs from ever establishing a prima facie case. 
enormously to a young mother with school age children." Id. 
87 Jd. at 69. 
88 Jd. 
89 Jd. at 71. 
90 Jd. 
91 Jd. at 70-71. 
92 Jd. at 64-67. 
93 DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 F. App'x 437 (5th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam). 
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A. DEHART EFFECTIVELY DELETES TITLE VII'S ANTI-RETALIATION 
PROVISION 
Juanita DeHart, an African-American, began employment as a 
Design Drafter for Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Baker Hughes") on April 10, 2000.94 In October 2000, she began 
complaining of air quality problems.95 To help her breathing, she 
requested to be moved to a different area, and Baker Hughes complied.96 
Even so, DeHart took two leaves of absence due to breathing problems 
and was diagnosed with a respiratory disease. 97 DeHart continued to 
make complaints concerning air quality problems until her eventual 
termination on April 19, 2004.98 Despite her time away from work and 
frequent complaints, DeHart received favorable performance reviews in 
both 2001 and 2002.99 
DeHart alleged that she met with her supervisor's boss in July 2002 
to complain of racial discrimination against herself and an African-
American coworker, Ron Sinnette. 100 While DeHart was on her second 
leave of absence in May 2003,101 Baker Hughes terminated Sinnette. 
Sinnette later filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination. 102 Shortly 
after DeHart returned to work from her second leave of absence and just 
before leaving again due to air quality problems,103 she was told on June 
8,2003, that she would not receive a pay raise that year. 104 
DeHart's 2003 annual review came just after her return to work at 
the beginning of July 2003. 105 Unlike her previous reviews, this time her 
ratings were not favorable. 106 She was rated "Development Needed" in 
every category in which she was evaluated. 107 In addition to giving 
DeHart her first poor ratings, Baker Hughes wrote a memorandum 
accompanying the review, criticizing DeHart as having a bad attitude and 
94 Id. at 438-39. 
95 Id. at 439. 
96 Id. Baker Hughes also complied for DeHart's request for an air filter in March 2003 when 
diesel fumes were bothering her. Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id at 440. 
99 Id at 439. 
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poor attendance. 108 Her situation continued to worsen in late July 2003 
when Baker Hughes denied DeHart's subsequent requests to have her 
workstation moved to a different area, despite physicians' 
recommendations. 109 
DeHart alleged that on August 15, 2003, an EEOC investigator 
called her and questioned her about Sinnette's racial discrimination 
claim. I 10 She claimed she told her supervisor's boss about the call when 
she got to work that day. I II Later that day, DeHart received a written 
warning from Baker Hughes for insubordination, for being 
argumentative, and for excessive absenteeism. I 12 
DeHart filed an EEOC claim on September 2, 2003, alleging that 
her poor 2003 performance review and the written warning of August 15 
were retaliatory actions by Baker Hughes for her participation in the 
EEOC investigation of Sinnette's claim. I 13 Baker Hughes terminated her 
on April 19, 2004. DeHart sued Baker Hughes and her boss in state 
court shortly thereafter. 114 Baker Hughes removed the action to federal 
court, and the district court granted summary judgment for defendants. I 15 
DeHart then appealed the district court's dismissal of her retaliation 
claims. I 16 
DeHart claimed three prima facie cases of retaliation. The district 
court ruled that all three failed as a matter of law.1I7 In her second claim, 
DeHart alleged that the written warning of August 15, 2003, and the 
denial of a pay raise on June 8, 2003, were adverse actions in retaliation 
for DeHart's participation in Sinnette's EEOC investigation. ll8 The 
appellate court did not find the written warning to be an adverse 
108 [d. 
109 [d. at 439-40. 
110 [d at 440. The court did not reach the factual issue of whether this call took place. [d. 






117 [d. Her first claim argued that Baker Hughes' denial of her request for sick leave and the 
opening of an investigative file against her were in retaliation for Sinnette's protected activity of 
filing an EEOC charge. [d. at 441. This claim failed because, not baving participated in the charge, 
DeHart could not claim Sinnette's protected activity as her own. ld. In her third claim, DeHart 
argued that her EEOC charge was a protected activity causally linked to her termination. [d. at 442. 
The court, when considering her past disciplinary record and the lack of temporal proximity between 
her charge and the date of her termination, held this claim failed because DeHart failed to establish a 
causal link. [d. at 443. 
118 [d. at 442. The court concluded that denial of her pay raise was not an adverse action 
because a causal link could not be shown: DeHart found out about the denial of a pay raise two 
months before filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 15
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action. 119 Such a finding would have allowed DeHart to go forward with 
her claim, but the court found that the performance warning did not 
satisfy this element because an adverse action is an action that deters an 
employee from filing a complaint, and DeHart was not deterred from 
complaining. 120 
The court first restated the Burlington Northern definition, which 
describes an adverse action as one that a reasonable employee would 
have found materially adverse, meaning it well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination. 121 Then the court gave two reasons why the written 
warning did not constitute an adverse action: 122 
Under the facts before us, we conclude that the written warning to 
DeHart would not 'have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 
or supporting a charge of discrimination.' In the first place, there were 
colorable grounds for the warning and a reasonable employee under 
the circumstances would have understood a warning under these 
circumstances was not necessarily indicative of a retaliatory mind-set. 
Furthermore, the August 15 written warning did not in fact dissuade a 
charge of discrimination, given that several weeks later on September 
2, a charge was filed. 123 
Because the appellate court did not find the written warning to be an 
adverse action, DeHart's second claim of retaliation failed. 124 
Although the court in DeHart gave two reasons why the employer's 
written warning did not constitute an adverse action, neither reason is 
appropriate. The first reason the written warning was not considered an 
adverse action is problematic in that it strays from the Burlington 
standard. 125 Nothing in the Burlington Northern deterrence test requires 
119 fd. 
120 fd. 
121 fd at 441. Before the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern in June 2006, the 
Fifth Circuit used the "ultimate employment decision" standard in determining whether an 
employer's actions constituted adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Walker v. Thompson, 214 
F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir. 2000); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Tex., P.A., 139 F.3d 
532,540 (5th Cir. 1998). 
122 DeHart, 214 F. App'x at 441. 
123 fd. 
124/d. 
125 The court stated "[i]n the first place, there were colorable grounds for the warning and a 
reasonable employee under the circumstances would have understood a warning under these 
circumstances was not necessarily indicative ofa retaliatory mind·set." DeHart, 214 F. App'x at 
441. The language regarding a "retaliatory mindset" appears to incorporate language from the 
EEOC Compliance Manual, which describes Title VII's anti-retaliation provision as "prohibit[ing] 
any adverse treatment that is based on retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the 
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity." Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. 
16
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an inquiry into whether there were appropriate grounds for the employer 
action or whether a reasonable employee in the plaintiffs situation 
would have thought the employer action showed a retaliatory mindset. 
These questions are irrelevant in deciding whether an adverse employer 
action exists. The test for the adverse action element of a retaliation 
claim instead asks whether the employer action was materially adverse: 
whether the employer's actions were harmful to the point that they could 
well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 
of discrimination. 126 
The second reason the court provided is DeHart's major flaw.127 
The court's reliance on DeHart's failure to be actually dissuaded from 
filing a complaint is what makes its application of the deterrence 
standard illogical. It shows that the DeHart court misinterpreted 
Burlington Northern's standard for what types of employer behavior 
constitute an adverse action in a way that effectively removes Title VII's 
protection against retaliation. 
B. To AVOID THE RISKS OF THIS MISAPPLICATION, COURTS MUST 
PROPERLY IN CORPORA TE THE OBJECTIVE ASPECT OF BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN'S STANDARD 
The DeHart court held that the very fact a discrimination claim was 
filed shows that the employer's action failed to dissuade a discrimination 
charge. 128 The problem with this ruling is that its circular reasoning acts 
as a "Catch-22" for plaintiffs. It would prevent a retaliation claim from 
succeeding if, after the allegedly retaliatory act, the plaintiff complained 
of retaliation or discrimination to the EEOC; but filing such a complaint 
is a prerequisite for a retaliation claim. 129 The inherent illogic of 
Co. v. White. 548 U.S. 53, 66 (quoting 2 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, p. 8-13 (1998». However, this is not the current test for finding an 
adverse action. 
Besides straying from the current standard for an adverse action, another problem with this 
reasoning is that whether there were "grounds for the warning" is better analyzed under the element 
of causation. Furthermore, the court's statement shows that it would assume an absurd (and 
incorrect) burden of proof by requiring the employer actions to be "necessarily indicative of a 
retaliatory mind-set." Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is improper to require a showing 
of \00% certainty that the employer's actions were based on retaliation when, in actuality, the 
plaintiff need only show that retaliation was a "motivating factor" for the treatment. See Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
126 Burlington Northern. 548 U.S. at 57. 
127 "Furthermore, the August 15 written warning did not in fact dissuade a charge of 
discrimination, given that several weeks later on September 2, a charge was filed." DeHart, 214 F. 
App'x at441. 
128 DeHart, 214 F. App'x at 442. 
129 See 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-4 (Westlaw 2007); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.\05 (Westlaw 
17
Beeler: Title VII's Protection Against Retaliation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
158 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
employing this self-cancelling rule would have the effect of barring any 
plaintiff from ever going forward with a retaliation claim. 
Perhaps the reason the DeHart court got it so wrong is that the 
deterrence test is simply hard to put into practice. The Supreme Court 
noted that the test is an objective one because it requires a look into 
whether a reasonable employee would be deterred from complaining if 
faced with the action. 130 But the test also includes a subjective aspect 
that requires considering the context of the particular employee. 131 By 
including both objective and subjective components, the Burlington 
Northern standard can be difficult for lower courts to apply. 
Incorrectly mixing subjective elements into the objective part of the 
test, the Fifth Circuit approached the adverse action issue too literally. 
The court in DeHart did not consider what deterrent effect this employer 
action might have on other reasonable employees; it only focused on 
what effect it actually had on the particular employee filing the 
lawsuit. 132 But when Justice Breyer articulated the standard for 
identifying adverse actions, he said they are actions that well might 
dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining of discrimination. 133 He 
did not say they are actions that actually do dissuade a reasonable worker 
from complaining of discrimination. The test is not an inquiry into what 
actions any particular employee actually took; rather, it inquires into how 
a reasonable worker would react under the circumstances. To properly 
apply the Burlington Northern standard, courts must correctly apply the 
objective part of the test by allowing a jury to consider the potential 
deterrent effects on a reasonable employee. 
DeHart's ruling and others like it, that the filing of a complaint with 
the EEOC leads to the conclusion there has been no adverse employer 
action that would support a retaliation claim,134 will have the effect of 
discouraging plaintiffs from coming forward with valid complaints of 
discrimination. If employees know that filing a discrimination or 
retaliation complaint will automatically make a retaliation claim fail, 
then they will be less likely to bring such complaints because they will 
know that they have no protection from subsequent retaliatory action by 
2008). 
130 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68-69. 
131 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69 ("We phrase the standard in general terms because the 
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. 
Context matters. "). 
132 "Furthermore, the August 15 written warning did not in fact dissuade a charge of 
discrimination, given that several weeks later on September 2, a charge was filed." DeHart, 214 F. 
App'x at 441. 
133 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68. 
134 DeHart, 214 F. App'x at 442. 18
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their employer. '35 Yet, the prohibition of discrimination within Title VII 
can only be enforced with the cooperation of employees who are willing 
to file complaints and act as witnesses. '36 
Consequently, if employers know that employees are not likely to 
file discrimination complaints because they no longer have protection 
from retaliation, then they would have less incentive to avoid 
discrimination; further, they could retaliate endlessly and without 
consequences against employees who do file discrimination complaints. 
In turn, if potential defendants were permitted to retaliate freely, 
individuals who witness discrimination would be afraid to report it and 
many violations might go unremedied as a result. 137 A rule like 
DeHart's that prevents employees from coming forward with complaints 
would therefore result in ineffective enforcement of Title VII's basic 
protections against discrimination. 
Unfortunately for Juanita DeHart, the simple fact that she properly 
followed the administrative procedures when engaging in protected 
activity precluded her from going forward with a retaliation charge. This 
case illustrates an important point: the Burlington Northern standard is 
proving itself not to be as beneficial to plaintiffs as many believed it 
would. "[T]his case is an example of a situation in which the broadened 
standard set out in Burlington actually assisted the employer in 
overcoming DeHart's retaliation claim.,,'38 This is contrary to 
predictions by critics of the new Burlington Northern standard who 
characterized its rule as too permissive. 
Another reason the DeHart holding is significant is that this same 
error in logic is affecting more plaintiffs than just Juanita'DeHart. 139 
135 Despite fewer claims and therefore less use of judicial resources, this result is inequitable 
in addition to being contrary to the purposes of Title VII. "Regardless of the degree or quality of 
harm to the particular complainant, retaliation harms the public interest by deterring others from 
filing a charge." 2 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 8-1 (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf. 
136 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 ("Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be 
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances." (quoting Mitchell v. 
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,292 (1960))). 
137 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005). 
138 Maria Greco Danaher, Adverse Action Must Deter Discrimination Claims, 9 No. 5 
LAWYERS J. 2 (Mar. 2, 2007). But see id, ("Employers should not interpret this case to mean that 
every time an employee files a subsequent charge of discrimination, a retaliation claim is 
precluded."). Even if it is not the case that a retaliation claim will be precluded every time a 
subsequent charge is filed, it is still inappropriate if this consideration results in even one claim 
being prevented from going forward. To say it will not happen every time is little consolation for 
the many employees whose claims will be rejected under such a rule. 
139 A Comment in the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender points out a similar absurd result 
in another case. "Without considering the specifics, the court declared that [the plaintiff's] claim did 
not meet the Burlington test: 'These actions, whether characterized as major or minor, did not deter 
[the plaintiff's] pursuit of new and expanded allegations of discrimination, either internally or 19
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This interpretion must be stopped before the right to be free from 
retaliation becomes completely hollow. 
III. CONCLUSION 
DeHart says that anytime an employee files a complaint of 
discrimination or retaliation, no previous act by the employer can be an 
adverse action that will support a retaliation claim. Jam yesterday, jam 
tomorrow, but never jam today. In holding that there could be no 
adverse action if DeHart was not, in fact, dissuaded from filing a 
complaint, the Fifth Circuit used self-contradictory, circular logic that 
would prevent anyone from ever bringing a retaliation claim. It makes 
no sense to hold that filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC 
defeats a required element of a retaliation claim when engaging in this 
protected activity is a prerequisite for a retaliation claim to ever exist. 
Furthermore, it is pointless to have statutory protection if it will never 
result in any relief. 
"Fair employment is too vital for haphazard enforcement.,,140 
Misapplying the deterrence standard in the manner DeHart has done is a 
huge step backwards in the progress that has been made toward ending 
discrimination in the workplace. To properly apply the standard from 
Burlington Northern, courts must consider whether a reasonable 
employee in the plaintiffs circumstances would have been deterred from 
complaining, not whether a plaintiff was actually deterred. 
Within its confusing definition of "materially adverse," it appears 
that what the Supreme Court attempted to articulate in Burlington 
Northern was a test that considers whether a reasonable employee would 
consider the employer action to be adverse. It should have simply made 
this the new standard instead of the deterrence test it adopted. If it had 
done so, the problem associated with a rule like the one set forth in 
DeHart would not occur. 
If courts continue to apply a rule barring a retaliation claim for the 
mere fact that a prerequisite of bringing the claim is present, then either 
Congress or the Supreme Court must provide further clarification on how 
to detect an adverse employer action. It is not too soon for the Supreme 
Court to hear this issue again by granting certiorari on a case where it 
administratively.'" Mary Newman, Comment, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White: The Scope oj Retaliatory Actions and a Legal Catch-22, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 519, 527 
(2007) (quoting Sykes v. Pa. State Police, No. 05-1389, 2007 WL 141064, at *6 (W.O. Pa. Jan. 17, 
2007)). This is another example of improper focus on whether a particular plaintiff was deterred 
from pursuing discrimination claims, rather than on what deterrent effect the employer's action 
might have on a reasonable employee. 
140 Exec. Order No. 12,106 (Feb. 23, 1978). 
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appears the lower court struggled to properly interpret the deterrence 
test. 141 Every moment the Court delays could result in another injured 
plaintiff who has no recourse. 
JESSICA L. BEELER* 
141 Just two years after the decision, Burlington Northern has already been cited over 6,000 
times; over 30 of these are negative cases that either called into doubt, declined to extend, or 
distinguished Burlington Northern . 
• J.D. Candidate 2009, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.A. 
Economics, Indiana University. I wish to thank Professor Oppenheimer for his helpful suggestions 
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